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The Tasks of Translatability1 
 
Peter D. Thomas 
 
 
1. “Something hasn’t been understood”. 
A man who had spent much of his adult life exiled in foreign 
lands suddenly found himself confronted with an unexpected 
incomprehension at home. In a meeting of speakers of his native 
language and a Babelian gathering from around the world, he 
realized that he both understood and yet could not understand 
what had been said. His confusion arose, however, not from the 
intrusion of an unrecognized voice of the other, but from the 
uncanny distance of his mother tongue. Speaking during one of his 
rare appearances at the Fourth Congress of the Communist 
International on the 13th November 1922, Lenin made the 
following remarks about the newly minted and much contested 
politics of the United Front: 
 
At the Third Congress, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the 
organisational structure of the Communist Parties and on the methods and 
content of their activities. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost 
entirely Russian, that is to say, everything in it is based on Russian conditions. 
This is its good point, but it is also its failing. It is its failing because I am sure 
that no foreigner can read it […] it is too Russian […] not because it is written 
in Russian – it has been excellently translated into all languages – but because 
[…] we have not learnt how to present our Russian experience to foreigners [in 
such a way that they might be able to] assimilate part of the Russian 
experience.2 
 
The problem that Lenin posed for consideration by the 
assembled delegates of the self-characterized ‘party of world 
revolution’ (unlike in earlier Congresses, now supported by the 
services of a professional translation bureau) was clearly not the 
problem of translation in a limited sense, as linguistically accurate 
 
1 A previous version of this text was presented at the Internationales Forschungszentrum 
Kulturwissenschaften (IFK), Vienna, on 23rd May 2019 as a keynote lecture during the 
conference ‘Passagen: Walter Benjamin and Antonio Gramsci’, organized by the Arbeitsgruppe 
Kulturwissenschaften / Cultural Studies at the University of Vienna. I am grateful to the 
attendees at the lecture and participants in the conference, particularly Ingo Pohn-Lauggas and 
Birgit Wagner, for critical remarks and suggestions. 
2 Lenin 1965b, pp. 431-2. 





‘reproduction’. Rather, it was what has come to be known more 
recently as the broader problem of ‘cultural translation’.3 For Lenin, 
the translation of experiences from one cultural context to another 
could not be successfully undertaken mechanically or passively, 
with the simple re-presentation of meanings derived from the so-
called ‘source language’ in the ‘target language’, to use the classic 
binary opposition structuring so much reflection on translation, 
even today. In the debate over the United Front in which Lenin 
was intervening, such a conception of origins and transfers would 
simply mean the imposition of the policy by the Russian centre on 
its ‘periphery’ in the Western European Communist Parties – 
precisely the position against which Lenin had consistently argued.4 
Rather, the problem Lenin posed was instead one of understanding 
translation as an active process of dialogue, in which ‘meaning’ is 
not univocal or constant, but plural and continually changing in 
context, retrospectively and prospectively. 
As Lenin was well aware, more depended upon the success of 
this particular translational praxis than is normally the case, when 
the humble translator merely seeks to avoid censure from pedants, 
publishers and associated Platonists, and can at most hope to be 
rewarded with ‘invisibility’.5 Now the stakes were much higher: the 
success of the revolution, not only in Russia, depended upon 
finding a way quickly to make comprehensible the slogans, policies 
and programmes that had been generated in the long history of 
Russian Social Democracy for a Communist movement that was by 
now truly global in its linguistic reach.6 It was not only words that 
needed to be communicated; even more crucial was the 
‘assimilation’ of the ‘experience’ of a successful revolution into the 
habits, perspectives and world-views of the international audience 
at the Fourth Congress, as prelude to their own practical translation 
into the revolutionary politics of their own countries. 
 
3 On the broad notion of cultural translation, see Homi Bhabha 1994; Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak 2007, pp. 263-76; Budick and Iser (eds), 1996. 
4 ‘The Equivalential Fallacy’ might be offered as a summary of the errors Lenin detected in 
those western European far leftists in the early 1920s who had thought they were presenting 
‘faithful’ translations of the militancy of the Russian Revolution while completely misreading 
its significance. See Lenin 1965a, pp. 17-118. 
5 Lawrence Venuti, 1995. 
6 On the development of the ‘relations of translation’ and the shifting relations of linguistic 
prestige in the early years of the Third International, see Sergei Chernov 2016, pp. 135-66. 





The translation of the strategic perspective of the United Front 
had failed, according to Lenin, not because any particular text 
among the many translations of the resolution from the Third 
Congress had inadequately conveyed the ‘meaning’ of ‘an original’ 
that they were supposed merely neutrally to ‘transpose’. Rather, this 
translational failure consisted in an inadequacy within the original 
itself. ‘The original’ – both the text of the resolution and the 
experiences in which it in turn had its ‘origins’ – had not known 
how to (re)formulate itself in relation to its now unexpectedly 
intimate other. The original formulation of the United Front, that 
is, had not known that it would be called upon not simply to speak 
for itself, but to carry the conditions of its ‘translatability’ within 
itself as constitutive of what it was, rather than a later supplement 
or addition.7 
 
2. The Tasks of the Translators 
A year before Lenin’s sobering assessment of the failures of the 
nascent international communist movement, a still young German 
writer was filled with anxiety that his soon to be published foray 
into the increasingly crowded field of German versions of 
Baudelaire might itself be judged a translational failure. His 
response was to write a preface entitled ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ [Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers].8 
Even though Walter Benjamin had at that time read little Marx 
and even less Lenin, it is remarkable how similar his fundamental 
orientation to the question of translation was to the Russian 
revolutionary leader, despite their many obvious differences. For 
both Lenin and Benjamin, the practice of translation should be 
understood not as the mere reproduction of the already given, but 
as the production of something new in a different context. In 
Benjamin’s terms, that stage of the ‘continuing life’ [das Stadium ihres 
Fortlebens] of a work of art that witnesses the emergence of its 
‘afterlife’ [das Überleben] – the moment in which a work’s 
‘translatability’ [Übersetzbarkeit] is affirmed – is no mere repetition of 
 
7 The notion of translatability as constitutive of a text in this sense could thus be seen as 
similar to Derrida’s views (extensively thematized in his critique of Searle in particular) regard-
ing the constitutive nature of ‘iterability’ to writing as such. See Jacques Derrida, 1988 [1977]. 
8 Walter Benjamin, ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, 1980 [1923], pp. 9-21; ‘The Task of the Trans-
lator’, 1996, pp. 253-63. On the cultural context in which Benjamin produced his translation 
and preface, and particularly his rivalry with Stefan George, see Brodersen, 1996, pp. 109-17. 





an origin, but a retrospective transformation that redefines it. 9 
Similarly, for both Lenin and Benjamin, genuine translation is not 
the simple transfer of what Benjamin calls an ‘inessential content’ 
from one place to another, but its transfiguration through temporal 
dislocation. It is precisely in this sense that Benjamin insists that a 
translation emerges not out of the life of the original itself, but only 
from its afterlife [das Überleben] 10  Lenin’s suggestion that over-
coming the failed translation of the Russian experiences into 
western European tongues would involve a transformation of the 
Russian ‘source language’ just as much as the occidental ‘target 
languages’ recalls Benjamin’s insistence that translation never 
occurs between two fixed entities, but only in the dialectical relation 
that both differentiates and simultaneously unifies them in what he 
calls a ‘higher and purer atmosphere of language’ [Luftkreis der 
Sprache] as such, in ‘the pure language’ [die reine Sprache].11 
Again, if translation is a ‘Form’ for Benjamin, a specific form 
alongside other similarly specific forms of literary production, for 
Lenin translation is conceived as a particular agitational mode, in 
terms nevertheless qualitatively continuous with other modes of 
socio-political communication.12 Lenin’s concern to understand how 
the political knowledge produced in the unrepeatable events leading 
up to the Russian Revolution could be ‘assimilated’ rather than 
merely derivatively imitated by other communists finds its 
Benjaminian correlate in the notion of translation as a search for 
the ‘echo of the original’. This echo is not given primordially in the 
original, however, but can only be constituted by determination in 
the totality of all languages.13 Finally, for both Lenin and Benjamin, 
translation in the fullest sense represents the fulfilment of a 
promise: the ‘pure language’ that Benjamin sees as both 
(retrospectively posited) precondition and consequence of 
translation rigorously practised realizes the promise inherent in 
 
9  ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 11; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 254 (translation 
modified). I have preferred the processual notion of ‘continuing’ to Zohn’s more static 
‘continued life’ to render das Fortleben in order to emphasize the developmental and ongoing 
dimension that I take to inform Benjamin’s strategic use of this notion, particularly in its 
distinction from ‘afterlife’ [das Überleben], as discussed below. 
10 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 9, p. 10; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 253, p. 254. 
11 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 14, p. 13; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 257 (translation 
modified). 
12 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 9; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 254. 
13 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 16; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 258. 





language as material form of human sociality, as unity of diverse 
intentions, just as for Lenin the translation of revolutionary 
experiences should culminate in the promise of no merely national 
or particular revolution, but of world revolution as such. 
‘The Task of the Translator’, despite its author’s initial anxiety, 
has achieved a phenomenal success. It has been defined by no less 
an authority than George Steiner as one of the most innovative 
contributions to translation theory not only in the twentieth 
century, but in the entire western literary and philosophical 
tradition. 14  It has stimulated a wide range of reflections from 
Derrida, de Man and Spivak to contemporary theorists such as 
Emily Apter and Barbara Cassin. It is an irony that seems both to 
affirm and to deny some of Benjamin’s central propositions in ‘The 
Task of the Translator’ that the success and extensive influence of 
this text has frequently involved heated debates over claimed 
‘mistranslations’ of Benjamin’s original ‘words’ and ‘intentions’.15 
A similar success has not been enjoyed by the theorization of 
translation developed by another writer who was young in the early 
1920s. Present in Moscow as a representative of the Communist 
Party of Italy, Antonio Gramsci had listened carefully to Lenin’s 
words at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International. 
They made such a strong impression upon him that he repeatedly 
recalled them over ten years later in the texts that have become 
known as the Prison Notebooks.16 Among them were four notebooks 
 
14 George Steiner, 1998, p. 283. Steiner lists Benjamin as one of the few to have said ‘anything 
fundamental or new about translation’ alongside Seneca, Saint Jerome, Luther, Dryden, 
Hölderlin, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Ezra Pound, Valéry, MacKenna, Franz 
Rosenzweig and Quine. The bibliography on the reception of Benjamin’s essay in numerous 
languages is now immense; Susan Ingram (1997, pp. 207-33) provides a survey of the initial 
anglophone debate in her ‘“The Task of the Translator”: Walter Benjamin’s Essay in English, a 
Forschungsbericht’, TTR. 
15 See, in particular, Steven Rendall (1997, pp. 191-206). The most influential discussion of the 
significance of different approaches to translating this text was undoubtedly that stimulated by 
Derrida and de Man’s divergent readings; see Derrida, 1985a, pp. 165-207; and de Man (1986), 
pp. 73-105. 
16 Q7§2, p. 854, November 1930 (PN, Vol. 3, p. 157). Gramsci again recalls Lenin’s remarks at 
the beginning of section V of Q11 (Q11§46, p. 1468; FSPN, p. 306), presumably penned in 
August 1932. As Peter Ives (2004, pp. 100-101) notes, Gramsci confuses the date of Lenin’s 
address to the Fourth Congress in 1922 (which Gramsci himself witnessed) with the Third 
Congress of 1921, to which Lenin in his remarks refers. References to Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks are given according to Valentino Gerratana’s Italian critical edition of the Quaderni del 
carcere (Gramsci 1975), following the internationally established standard of notebook number 
(Q), number of note (§), and page number. (For English-language translations of the quota-
tions, see under Gramsci in the Bibliography). Dates of individual notes are given according to 





in which Gramsci refined his skills as a translator (particularly from 
German to Italian), and a series of notes on the theme of transla-
tion and translatability that were revisited, revised and transcribed 
primarily between 1930 and 1932, but in some instances extending 
also to 1935. These notes eventually assumed a prominent position 
in one of Gramsci’s most organically coherent notebooks, Note-
book 11, which aimed to provide a new type of introduction to the 
study of philosophy. Gramsci’s novel reflections on the philosoph-
ical, historical and political significance of translation and particul-
arly his distinctive formulation of the notion of translatability, how-
ever, are not noted in any of the now canonical studies on the 
history of translation theory. Indeed, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that, until relatively recently, Gramsci simply 
didn’t exist in the field of translation studies.17 
The situation was admittedly not radically different even in the 
field of Gramscian studies for a long period. The theme of 
translation and translatability did not play a prominent role in the 
first phase of Gramsci’s widespread international reception, in the 
1960s and 1970s, when attention to Gramsci’s philosophical, 
political and historical insights tended to push a range of other 
themes very much into the shade (the neglect of Gramsci’s 
contribution to the philosophy of language in this period is a 
notable case study). 18  The publication of Valentino Gerratana’s 
critical edition of the Prison Notebooks in 1975 did little to change 
this state of affairs in a positive sense. In an otherwise scrupulous 
attempt to present the Prison Notebooks to contemporary readers just 
as Gramsci had written them, Gerratana’s edition in fact excluded 
 
the chronology established in Gianni Francioni (1984) and the revisions contained in the 
appendix to Cospito, 2011, pp. 896-904. 
17 Gramsci is not discussed in Steiner’s classic study (who does however reference Croce and 
Gentile), just as he is absent from most other influential histories of translation theory; see, for 
instance, Susan Bassnett-McGuire, 1980; Jean-René Ladmiral, 1994. He is similarly excluded 
from major anthologies of texts on theories and histories of translation; see, for instance, 
Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet (eds), 1992; and Lawrence Venuti, 2000. Remarkably, 
Gramsci’s theory of translatability is not even mentioned in the otherwise comprehensive and 
more recent Dictionary of Untranslatables. A Philosophical Lexicon, (Cassin [ed.], 2014 [2004]. 
18 Among the first studies to emphasize the significance of Gramsci’s university training in 
historical linguistics was Franco Lo Piparo (1979). More recent studies, alongside Peter Ives’s 
previously cited book, include Giancarlo Schirru’s exhaustive study of Gramsci’s Turin years 
(Schirru 2011, pp. 925-73) and the fundamental work of Alessandro Carlucci (Carlucci, 2013). 
It is obviously not coincidental that the recovery of Gramsci’s linguistic reflections has 
occurred in the same period in which attention has also turned to his thoughts on translation 
and translatability. 





the vast majority of Gramsci’s own translations.19 Although this 
omission and its deleterious impact upon our understanding of the 
context and significance of Gramsci’s ‘own’ notes was forcefully 
highlighted by Lucia Borghese in 1981, it was only in 2007 that 
these translations were finally published in full in the new Edizione 
nazionale, in the first volumes of the section dedicated to Gramsci’s 
carceral production under the editorship of Gianni Francioni.20 
In the intervening period, the revival of Gramscian studies 
founded upon more rigorous philological and historico-critical prin-
ciples both in Italy and abroad has redimensioned our understand-
ing of the complexity of the Prison Notebooks and particularly the 
‘rhythm’ of thought that traverses them. Thanks to this new season 
of studies, we can now see that translation is not merely one among 
the many themes explored in the Prison Notebooks. Both the practice 
and theory of translation instead play a crucial role in the general 
economy of the overall development of Gramsci’s carceral writing 
project.21 Above all, the distinctive non-essentialist notion of ‘trans-
latability’ matures during Gramsci’s years in prison into one of the 
central methodological innovations of his proposed reformulation 
of Marxism as a ‘philosophy of praxis’ and as a ‘living philology’. 
 
3. Philology and Politics between Gramsci and Benjamin 
The relationship of Benjamin and Gramsci’s thoughts on trans-
lation has already been the subject of a number of significant stud-
ies, though admittedly far fewer than those that have explored their 
more general affinities in terms of the novel forms of their post-
 
19 For a discussion of the reasons for this exclusion, see Valentino Gerratana, ‘Prefazione’, in 
Gramsci (1975), pp. xxxvii-viii. Giuseppe Cospito (2011) synthesizes and extends the scholar-
ship that demonstrates why Gerratana’s assessment of the relation between the translations 
and the other writings Gramsci composed in prison now needs to be completely revised. 
20 Lucia Borghese (1981, pp. 635-65); Antonio Gramsci (2007a). 
21 André Tosel’s work, from the same period as Borghese’s, constitutes an important early 
exception; see Tosel (1981) Significant early contributions on Gramsci’s concept of 
translatability, alongside more recent studies, are collected in Ives and Lacorte (eds), 2010. The 
most extended studies of Gramsci’s theory of translatability are the pathbreaking works by 
Derek Boothman (2004a, p. 247-66; and 2004b). The relevance of Gramsci to more recent 
theories of cultural translation has been highlighted by both by Giorgio Baratta (2007) and 
Birgit Wagner (2012). Fabio Frosini places the distinctive notion of translatability at the centre 
of the reconstruction of Gramsci’s philosophical thought in Frosini (2010), as well as in 
numerous other texts. More recently, among a burgeoning field, see the important 
contributions of Martín Cortés (2015); Romain Descendre and Jean-Claude Zancarini (2016); 
Giuseppe Cospito (2017, pp. 47-65); Giuliano Guzzone (2018); and Stephen Shapiro and Neil 
Lazarus (2018, pp. 1-36). 





humous works, their theories of modernity, their explanations for 
the rise of fascism, or their criticisms of the emerging Marxist 
orthodoxies of their day.22 In this text, I propose a dialogical read-
ing ‘against the grain’ of three constellations of some of their key 
concepts. My aim here is both to explore the tensions and trans-
formations that emerge in the development of their respective 
works – in Gramsci’s words, their ‘rhythm of thought’ – and also to 
problematize influential understandings of each writer’s theory of 
the nature of translation and of its philosophical presuppositions 
and implications. These constellations revolve around the Gram-
scian notions of hegemony, of translation between different ethico-
political contexts, and of reciprocal translatability. They are here 
read through the Benjaminian notions of translation as generative 
of the ‘afterlife’ of a literary work, as participating in a ‘pure lang-
uage’ that functions as translation’s ‘horizon’, and as constituting an 
‘echo’ of the original text in a new linguistic and historical context. 
First, Gramsci’s research on the translation of political strategies 
and techniques from one socio-political formation and historical con-
juncture to another – above all, evident in his translation of the Bol-
shevik notion of gegemoniya into what became his signature concept 
of egemonia – is here read in relation to Benjamin’s reflections on the 
‘afterlife’ of a text as the affirmation of its constitutive translatability. 
Second, the historicist theory of the potential for translation 
between different national and linguistic cultures developed in the 
Prison Notebooks is viewed through the lens of Benjamin’s theory of 
the ‘pure language’ towards which translation strives, the horizon of 
the totality of the relations of all languages that translation alone 
can produce. 
Third, Gramsci’s development of a non-essentialist theory of the 
reciprocal translatability of discourses, conceived not simply as 
systems of signification but as conflicting or reinforcing forms of 
socio-political organization and action, is used to rethink 
 
22 Studies dedicated specifically to a comparison between Gramsci and Benjamin’s theorisation 
of translation include André Tosel (1996, pp. 55-66); Peter Ives (2004, pp. 97-133); and most 
recently, the important study of Saša Hrnjez (2019, pp. 40-71). I also recall here the IGS-
sponsored conference held in Naples in 2003, ‘Dialoghi del carcere: Gramsci incontra 
Benjamin’, at which the sadly departed Giorgio Baratta and Domenico Jervolino presented 
significant papers. The more general comparative study of Gramsci and Benjamin has been 
explored by a number of authors, though rarely in great textual detail; Daniel Bensaïd’s oeuvre 
represents a significant exception, as do the other articles collected in this issue of the 
International Gramsci Journal. 





Benjamin’s notion of the ‘echo’ of the original in translation in non-
foundational terms. 
In each case, it is the encounter of Gramsci and Benjamin not 
only on their points of clear convergence, but even more signify-
cantly, on those points where they might seem to diverge, that 
forms the basis for translation and transposition between their 
respective thought-worlds – a translation that at the same time 
represents an attempt to open their works up to their immanent 
transformation. 
 
4. The ‘Afterlife’ of Hegemony 
While the early international reception of Gramsci’s work, 
particularly in the anglophone New Left, sometimes erroneously 
regarded hegemony as a concept of Gramsci’s own coinage, more 
recent studies have focused upon the multiple sources that were 
synthesized in the Prison Notebooks in this now widely influential 
political word. What has perhaps been less noted are the complex 
politics of translation that mark the history of hegemony, from its 
elaboration in a variety of historical, political and philosophical 
contexts in ancient Greece, its descent into ‘untranslatability’ for 
well over a millennia, to its revival in the classical inheritances of 
early nineteenth century European nationalisms and later transpos-
ition and development in early Russian Social Democracy.23 
Relations of translation are also central to Gramsci’s own usage 
of the word, both before and during imprisonment. Gramsci’s 
precarceral activism as party leader can in large part be regarded as 
an extended ‘translational mediation’ on the significance of the 
debates about hegemony and its relation to the politics of the 
United Front that he had encountered amongst the Bolshevik 
leaders during his period in Moscow in 1922-3. That this translation 
was not simply an imitative transposition of a word from East to 
West is evident by the significant historical, formal, methodological 
and conceptual innovations that Gramsci introduced to the concept 
of hegemony, particularly in the Prison Notebooks. 
 
23  On the development of hegemony among the classical Greek historians, see John 
Wickersham (1994). For the most comprehensive surveys of the conceptual history of 
hegemony, see Bruno Bongiovanni and Luigi Bonanate (1993, pp. 470-77); Giuseppe Cospito 
(2016, pp. 49-88); Derek Boothman (2008, pp. 201-15), which analyses the multiple currents 
that flowed into Gramsci’s thinking about hegemony. 





Historically, Gramsci extends the range of the concept, from 
early twentieth century Russia back to eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Western Europe. Formally, the concept of hegemony had 
functioned in the debates of Russian social democracy as the 
advocacy of the emergence of a qualitatively different form of 
political relationality, outside the institutional structures of an 
exclusionary absolutism; in Gramsci’s translation, it is instead often 
used to analyse social formations (France, Italy, and so forth) 
defined by the consolidation of the principle of popular sovereignty 
and its simultaneous practical neutralization, by means of the 
passive inclusion of popular political forces in an established 
bourgeois hegemonic project; ‘passive revolution’ is the term that 
Gramsci gradually comes to propose for this translation of 
hegemony into the context of the bourgeois politics of the modern 
parliamentary state and its transmogrification under Fascism. 24 
Methodologically, Gramsci translates hegemony from the register 
of the political programme, where hegemony functions both 
strategically and prefiguratively, to that of historico-political 
analysis, in which the concept operates as description and critique. 
The decisively new addition that Gramsci made to the range of 
meanings of hegemony, however, consisted in his translation of it 
into the ‘political language’ of the Italian debate in the 1920s on the 
nature of political authority, particularly in terms of the relation 
between ‘force and consent’. It was a debate that occurred on num-
erous fronts, but which was, in conceptual terms, particularly re-
fracted through the lens of the contemporary discussion of Machia-
velli.25 The theme of a dialectical tension between ‘force and con-
sent’ constitutes one of the ways (but by no means the only way) in 
which Gramsci theorizes hegemony in the Prison Notebooks. This 
couplet has no precise counterpart in the Bolshevik discussions 
from which Gramsci drew his initial inspiration. In the Russian 
debate, hegemony was primarily used to theorize the specific diffi-
culties of political, social and cultural leadership and mobilization 
 
24 I have elsewhere analysed the gradual emergence of the notion of ‘passive revolution’ in the 
Prison Notebooks in relation to the concepts of hegemony and particularly ‘the revolution in 
permanence’. See Peter D. Thomas 2020, pp. 117-46). 
25 The notion of a ‘political language’ is used here in the sense developed particularly in Pocock 
(1989). Regarding the debate on force and consent in Italy in the 1920s, particularly in relation 
to contemporary Machiavelli scholarship and commentary, see Leonardo Paggi (1970, pp. 372 
et sqq.); Michele Fiorillo in Giasi (ed. 2008, pp. 839-59); Fabio Frosini (2013, pp. 545-89). 





(among allied subaltern classes), while themes of coercion (exer-
cised over non-allied classes) were discussed in terms of the related 
but distinct notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat.26 Never-
theless, such has been the success of this particular translation that 
some later interpreters have taken the couplet of force and consent 
to constitute a ‘hard core’ of the notion of hegemony itself, not 
only in Gramsci or the Russian context, but throughout its entire 
long journey from ancient Greece to contemporary critical theory.27 
Gramsci’s various translations of hegemony can be understood 
as a particularly pointed demonstration of Benjamin’s notion that 
the translatability of a text is only confirmed in its ‘afterlife’ [das 
Überleben]. This afterlife does indeed emerge at a particular moment 
of a text’s ‘continuing life’ [das Fortleben], but is qualitatively distinct 
from it. A translation for Benjamin may seem to issue ‘from the 
original’ (itself never identical to itself, because always transformed 
by its continuing life even before it is translated); but as he immed-
iately adds, the translation emerges ‘not so much from [the origin-
al’s] life as from its afterlife’.28 Contra an influential tradition of 
interpretation that sees Benjamin’s argument here as uncertainly 
caught between a Platonism of origins and a messianism of ends, 
translation in ‘The Task of the Translator’ is not depicted as the 
result of the ‘survival’ of an originary translatability; it is not merely 
a ‘living on’ of what was already there in potential. 29 On the con-
 
26 Craig Brandist (2015) provides an exhaustive account of the importance of hegemony in 
Russian Social Democracy, both before and particularly after the revolution. 
27 Perry Anderson’s reconstruction of the history of hegemony in The H-Word (Anderson, 
2017) is entirely based upon this anachronistic projection of a theme from the 1920s (refracted 
through a particular reading of the Prison Notebooks that was affirmed in the early 1960s, and 
remains today one of the most influential understandings of the nature of hegemony) back 
onto periods in which the word hegemony was deployed on the basis of very different 
coordinates and presuppositions. It leads him to neglect significant variations in hegemony’s 
semantic field in Ancient Greece (particularly in ethical discourses), in pre-Risorgimento Italy 
(Gioberti is entirely absent from his history) and in post-Revolutionary Russia (particularly in 
Lenin’s last writings on cultural revolution). 
28 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 10; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 254. For Benjamin’s 
claim of the original’s transformation through time, see p. 12; p. 256. Zohn’s translation does 
not maintain the distinction between fortleben and überleben, sometimes using afterlife to render 
them both. Compare, for instance, the text of his translation with Benjamin’s own words 
regarding the relation of the original, its continuing life, stage of fame and translation: p. 11; p. 
255. 
29 Derrida’s emphasis upon the notion of translation as a ‘sur-vival’ – in effect, collapsing the 
distinct meanings that I am arguing Benjamin ascribed to fortleben and überleben – leads him to 
think translation in terms of ‘living on’, inheritance, and ultimately a mourning for the loss of 
origins; as Derrida once revealingly remarked, in translation ‘one always has to postulate an 
original’, even if it is only to deny its authenticity (Derrida, 1985b, p. 147). See also, in addition 





trary, while for Benjamin a translation occurs during the continuing 
life of a text and marks a decisive stage of its development (what he 
refers to as its ‘fame’ [Ruhm]), its ‘afterlife’, conceived as a distinct 
mode of its existence in discontinuity with its ‘pre-translated’ state, 
is itself only concretely realized in the achieved fact of a translation. 
It is this achievement that retrospectively redefines a text’s origins 
and determines the very translatability [Übersetzbarkeit] of what only 
now can be seen as ‘the original’.30 
The translatability of hegemony did not derive from some 
mythical quality that was already ‘there’ in the ‘original’ Greek word, 
and which its subsequent translations have only more or less 
adequately approximated without ever exactly reproducing. It was 
rather the history of its reception and interpretation that 
retrospectively reordered the field of its visibility and determined its 
capacity to speak differently in different historical epochs. 
Gramsci’s translations of hegemony and their influence on 
subsequent understandings of its history and meaning provide an 
almost paradigmatic case study of the fact that a word is not born 
translatable, but only becomes so. The becoming translatable of a 
word is ultimately determined not by the force of its origins but by 
the history of the effects that a word’s resonance in different 
contexts generate as the traces of its always excessive afterlife. 
 
to ‘Des Tours du Babel’ (Derrida 1985a), both ‘Living On’ and ‘Border Lines’, in Bloom (1979 
[1978]). One of the most penetrating accounts of Derrida’s notion of translation is Kathleen 
Davis (2001); see in particular her discussion of Derrida’s reading of Benjamin on pp. 40-46). 
Derrida’s notion of the simultaneously totally translatable and totally untranslatable arises from 
this (often implicit) postulation, one he shares with many contemporary theorists of the 
untranslatable. A similar conflation is at work in de Man’s reading, which closely associates 
Überleben with the notion of late maturation [Nachreife]; see his ‘Conclusion: On Walter 
Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”’, p. 85. In the cases of both Derrida and de Man, 
Benjamin’s sometimes organic metaphors lead them to overlook the extent to which the 
notion of afterlife represents not the ‘original’ text’s temporal continuity (even in a sublated 
sense), but instead the rupture of its retrospective and dialectical reconfiguration. 
30 It is in this sense that I read Benjamin’s argument that a translation ‘comes later than the 
original’ and that translatability is ‘immanent’ [innewohnt] to the original (p. 10; p. 254, 
translation modified) not in terms of the temporal priority accorded by the mimetic theoretical 
tradition to the original (translation as derivative imitation), but in terms of retrospective 
reconfiguration. In translational praxis, a previously singular instance is redefined by its 
insertion into a manifestly constructed ‘causal’ sequence; an ‘original’ only becomes such at the 
moment of its supposed repetition in translation, before which it was simply indeterminate 
even in relation to itself. This is not a question of how translation ‘modifies the original’, as 
Derrida suggests (1985b, p. 122), because prior to translation there was no ‘original’ text at all 
in this sense. It is rather the problem of how the original text is constituted as an origin only in 
the process of translation. For an important discussion of the complexity of Benjamin’s 
relation to the mimetic tradition, see Andrew Benjamin (1989). 





5. The ‘Ursprache’ of ‘Pure Language’ 
Gramsci’s research regarding an historicist theory of the 
possibility of translation between different cultures can be regarded 
as a theoretical generalization of the impulse behind his expansive 
practical translations of hegemony. Here Gramsci’s privileged 
reference was The Holy Family, where Marx, following upon a theme 
in Kant, Hegel and Heine,31 argues that the political language of the 
French revolution (particularly what Gramsci glosses as ‘Jacobin 
phraseology’) ‘corresponds to’ and ‘can be translated into’ the 
language of classical German philosophy.32 In an early version of 
this argument, Gramsci argues, following Marx, that ‘the formulae 
of French politics of the revolution can be reduced [si riducono] to 
the principles of classical German philosophy’, in a relationship of 
distillation.33 How could such a translation between two distinct 
linguistic and cultural registers be possible? 
In a significant line of research, particularly in notebooks 4 and 8 
but also in notebooks 11 and 15,34 Gramsci seems to argue that 
such a translation could occur because different cultural and ling-
uistic expressions are fundamentally only different ways of compre-
hending similar, if not the same, socio-political and cultural exper-
iences, diversely expressed in different languages and genres due to 
different national traditions and institutions. In other words, French 
politics and German philosophy – and, Gramsci soon adds, follow-
ing Engels and Lenin, English political economy – would be translat-
able because they represent particular forms of comprehension and 
expression of a more general if not universal experience, namely, 
the uneven emergence of political modernity in each of those social 
formations. For such a perspective, linguistic or cultural diversity 
seems to be grounded in the commonality or commensurability of a 
 
31  Gramsci discusses the lineage at length in Q8§208, p. 1066-7, (PN Vol. 3, pp. 355-6) 
February-March 1932, adding to the traditional German line of inheritance the Italian 
Carducci. 
32The reference to the Jacobins occurs in Q1§44, p. 51 (PN Vol. 1, p. 148), February-March 
1930; the reverberations of the historical experience of Jacobinism, both in France and 
internationally, remains a constant concern throughout the Prison Notebooks. The notion of a 
‘correspondence’ between languages is formulated both in Q1§44 and, not for the last time, in 
Q4§42, p. 467 (PN Vol. 2, p. 191), October 1930. 
33 Q3§48, p. 331 (PN Vol. 2, p. 51), June-July 1930. 
34 See in particular Q15§64, p. 1828-9 (FSPN, pp. 314-5), June-July 1933, in which Gramsci 
uses the comparison of revolutionary France and philosophical Germany as a model for 
comprehending the relations between Greece and Rome. 





seemingly ‘pre-linguistic’ experience.35 Gramsci will even resort, in 
early 1932, to traditional metaphors of the Marxist tradition, argu-
ing that ‘two structures have equivalent and reciprocally translatable 
superstructures’.36 He explains this position in more extended terms 
several months later, in the Summer of 1932. He argues that  
 
translatability presupposes that a given phase of civilization has a 
‘fundamentally’ identical cultural expression, even if the language is historically 
different, determined by the particular tradition of each national culture and 
each philosophical system, by the predominance of an intellectual or practical 
activity etc. Thus we should see if translatability is possible between 
expressions of different phases of civilization, insofar as these phases are 
moments of development from one to the other, and are thus mutually 
integrated, or if a given expression can be translated with terms of a previous 
phase of the same civilization, a previous phase, however, which is more 
comprehensible than the given language etc.37 
 
Translatability in this version seems to be determined by the 
existence of a fundamental identity or even ‘universalism’ (within 
certain geopolitical limits) underlying and informing different 
cultures and languages, which are grasped as merely 
epiphenomenal, or superstructural elements that comprehend a 
phenomenal if not noumenal base. Translation in this perspective 
would thus appear to be premised on a detour via the generic, or a 
commonality of shared historical experience. 
Even more intriguing are the claims that frame and supplement 
this argument. Gramsci had begun this note by asking ‘if the 
reciprocal translatability of various philosophical and scientific 
languages is a “critical” element that belongs to every conception of 
the world, or only to the philosophy of praxis (in an organic way) 
and only partially able to be appropriated by other philosophies’. 
He concludes by stating that ‘it thus seems that one can say that 
 
35 Derek Boothman (2004a) explores the complexity of this dimension of Gramsci’s theory not 
only in comparison to dominant theories of translation, but particularly in relation to major 
‘realist’ paradigms of philosophy and history of science in the twentieth century. Fabio Frosini 
(2010) formulates Gramsci’s notion of the linguistic diversity that underwrites the possibility of 
translation in terms that draw upon similar presuppositions: ‘languages say the same thing in 
different ways; or better, they can say the same thing because they are different. There is thus a 
difference that not only does not impede, but rather is that which makes identity possible’ (p. 
31); ‘the different national traditions need to be deciphered as different forms of response to 
historical problems … fundamentally identical’ (p. 176). 
36 Q8§208, p. 1066-7 (PN, Vol. 3, p. 356) , February-March 1932. 
37 Q11§47, p. 1468 (FSPN, p. 307), August-December 1932. 





only in the philosophy of praxis is “translation” organic and 
profound, while from other points of view it is often a simple game 
of generic “schematisms”’.38 Read quickly, and in a way contrary to 
Gramsci’s arguments elsewhere, it might seem that with this 
formulation Gramsci is suggesting that Marxism has a privileged 
access to a ‘grammar’ of universal history.39 It would be on the 
basis of activating this grammar, almost as a decoding machine, that 
translation between different particular languages or cultural 
paradigms would become possible. In other words, Marxism – and, 
seemingly, particularly Gramsci’s version of it as a philosophy of 
praxis – would be represented as a metanarrative, within which 
other narratives can be integrated and subsequently deciphered. 
With such an emphasis upon a foundational paradigm, there 
might seem here to be some similarities to Benjamin’s conception 
that translation involves access to a ‘pure language’ [reine Sprache], or 
as he also puts it in in continuity with other themes in his thought 
from the early 1920s such as ‘true politics’, a ‘true language’ [wahre 
Sprache]. 40  Steiner provides a representative example of this 
interpretation. For him, Benjamin’s ‘pure language’ should be 
understood as that which ‘precedes and underlies’ other languages. 
He characterizes it as a ‘universal language’ or ‘origin’ to which the 
translation, in its derivative role, seeks to ‘return’, a ‘common 
source’ of all languages. Steiner even goes so far as to characterize 
Benjamin’s ‘pure language’ explicitly as an ‘Ur-sprache’. 41  It is a 
reading that is effectively in continuity with some of the previously 
discussed interpretations of Benjamin’s theory of translation that 
emphasize, with whatever qualifications, the importance of 
determining an origin for the translational process. 
What such a reading neglects is the ‘regulative’ rather the 
founding force of pure language for Benjamin. The pure language 
does not subsist in the ‘life’ or even ‘continuing life’ of a text, but 
always by definition exceeds it. A glimpse of such a pure language – 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 ‘Contrary to his insights elsewhere’, because Gramsci was a consistently fierce critic of the 
type of abstract universalism embodied in the enthusiasm for Esperanto in his time, including 
in the socialist movement. See Q3§76, p. 353 (PN Vol. 2, p. 73), August 1930; Q11§45, p. 1467  
(FSPN, p. 304), August-December 1932; Q23§39, p. 2235 (SCW, p. 268), from July-August 
1934. 
40 Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 13; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 257. On the Kantian 
dimensions of the notion of ‘true politics’, see Massimiliano Tomba (2006). 
41 Steiner, After Babel, p. 66-7. 





and only a glimpse – is given by a text’s ‘afterlife’, or in other 
words, from that – fleeting and unrepeatable – moment when its 
translatability is affirmed in the concrete praxis of translation. The 
afterlife of a text cannot be predetermined, or even predicted, 
before this moment; it does not organically emerge from the con-
tinuing life of the text, but represents a radical rupture of such a 
teleological temporal continuum. In a similar way, the pure lang-
uage that Benjamin posits in relation to translatability can only ever 
be determined retrospectively in the achieved unity of the relations 
of languages that are constructed actively in the various ‘forms’ of 
translation inherent in and constitutive of all modes of intentional 
communication, but particularly intensely in the specific ‘form’ of 
literary (especially poetic) translation.42 Rather than a return to ori-
gins, what Benjamin’s pure language instead offers in my view is an 
ultimately ‘regulative’ instance (in a Kantian sense) that constitutiv-
ly could not be confirmed empirically in past or future. It represents 
an unreachable limit that orients the endless differentiation of 
translation rather than an end state in which identity is finally 
affirmed. It is, to modify one of Derrida’s formulations inspired in 
part by Benjamin, a type of ‘weak messianic power’ without mess-
ianism, which refers not to origins or ends, but to the non-teleo-
logical purposiveness implicit in all forms of historical practice.43 
In a structurally similar way, the relations of ‘correspondence’ 
between Jacobinism and classical German idealism may have later 
appeared to the critical tradition that Gramsci inherited and 
extended to be premised upon a ‘“fundamentally” identical cultural 
expression’. But this was not an equivalence simply given in a 
civilizational structure, waiting to be comprehended by more or less 
adequate interpreters. Rather, it was the active equation of these 
two significant ethico-political movements operated by this critical 
tradition itself that had enabled those distinct historical experiences 
 
42 Benjamin defines this ‘pure language’ as ‘the totality of [all individual languages’] intentions 
supplementing one another’, and further, as ‘the harmony of all the various ways of thinking’ 
[die Harmonie all jener Arten des Meinens]. ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 14; ‘The Task of the 
Translator’, p. 257 (translation modified). While Zohn’s rendition of ‘all the various ways of 
meaning’ in this context has the advantage of preserving Benjamin’s juxtaposition between 
meinen and ‘what is meant’ [das Gemeinte] (elsewhere Zohn uses the vocabulary of intentionality), 
I have preferred to render it with the more generic ‘way of thinking’ in order to emphasize the 
processual nature of Benjamin’s argument, and to avoid the confusion of this generic process 
with any particular content or significance (for Benjamin, Sinn, which Zohn also sometimes 
renders in English as ‘meaning’). 
43 An important immanent critique of Derrida’s notion can be found in Sami Khatib (2013). 





‘to correspond’ in retrospect, that is, in the communicational rather 
than identitarian sense of correspondence. The conditions for the 
affirmation of their reciprocal translatability were, in other words, 
not given in their origins; they were instead constructed politically 
in the ongoing translational process that is the history of the 
relations between them. 
 
6. The ‘Echo’ of Origins 
Gramsci’s development of a distinctive notion of what he comes 
to call reciprocal translatability can be regarded as an attempt to 
explain, without falling into a ‘schematism’ of origins, primacy or 
goals, why it is only within the philosophy of praxis that translation 
can be ‘organic and profound’. The notion of a reciprocity of 
translatability had already been introduced as a problematizing 
qualification in Gramsci’s earliest notes in which translation was 
formulated in terms of ‘“reduction”’ (tellingly, itself problematized 
by Gramsci’s habit of the critical use of quotation marks).44 The 
theme of reciprocity increases in importance throughout the Prison 
Notebooks, assuming a central role of conceptual clarification in 
Gramsci’s late revisions to some of his earliest notes. In one of his 
final notebooks, for instance, the metaphor of a ‘reduction’ 
between France and Germany is abandoned, and he speaks instead, 
following Hegel, of the ‘parallel and reciprocally translatable 
juridical-political language of the Jacobins and the concepts of 
classical German philosophy’.45 Rather the conceiving translation in 
terms of foundational and secondary moments, this model instead 
explores translatability in terms of the primacy of the relation over 
the related terms, or in other words, in terms of a non-essentialist 
and post-foundationalist dialectical relationship.46 
As so often in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci’s engagement with 
Croce was decisive for these conceptual developments. Croce had 
famously theorized the impossibility of translation, of literary works 
and poetry in particular, because it ‘diminishes’ or ‘despoils’ the 
 
44 On Gramsci distinctive ‘philology of the quotation mark’, see Dario Ragazzini’s important 
study (Ragazzini 2002 p. 17). The use of this critical technique is notable in Q3§48, p. 331 (PN 
Vol. 2, p. 51), June-July 1930, where Gramsci initially spoke of a ‘reciprocal “reduction”, so to 
speak’, in a type of double problematization (graphically and idiomatically). 
45 Q19§24, p. 2028 (SPN, p.78), July-August 1934-February 1935. Q19§24 is a revision of the 
previously cited Q1§44. 
46 The relation of Gramsci’s notions of translation and translatability to the dialectical tradition 
is creatively explored in Hrnjez’s, ‘Traducibilità, Dialettica, Contraddizione’ (Hrnjez 2019). 





original. 47  Croce’s is a familiar Platonic gesture that depicts 
translation as yet another mimetic failure to transport the veracity 
and intensity of an origin into what are assumed to be its merely 
derivative copies. Translation for Croce must always fail (at least as 
far as aesthetic works are concerned) because the original work is 
posited to be, in its essence, a singular and unrepeatable fusion of 
intuition and expression; an exact replication of any such moment 
is by definition impossible. As Croce’s former comrade in arms and 
later antagonist, Giovanni Gentile, had noted, this position at its 
limit makes the unity of the historical process inconceivable, for it 
negates the possibility of ‘translation’, or coherent transition, even 
from one historical moment to the next.48 
Gramsci’s quite different response to the presuppositions of 
Croce’s line of reasoning is as brief as it is brutal: conceived in these 
identitarian terms, a ‘perfect’ translation may not be possible, he ad-
mits, before asking: but ‘what language is exactly translatable into 
another language? What single word is exactly translatable into an-
other language?’.49 As Gramsci recognized, Croce’s notion of the 
impossibility of translation is based upon at least two dubious pre-
suppositions. First, it presupposes that translation, strictly conceived, 
should involve the mimetic reproduction of a pure original, or in 
other words, that translation should involve the (re)production of 
identity. It is as if translation ideally should involve a complete and 
total transfer of both content and form, almost as if it would empty 
out the original but only in order for the original to ‘re-present’ 
itself in the ‘copy’ as its immutable self, in a journey that changes 
nothing. Second, the thesis of the impossibility of translation, despite 
its claims, in fact presupposes the theoretical possibility of such 
identity or equivalence, in order then to deny that this theoretical 
possibility is ever realized in any particular act of translation. Each 
empirical, particular act of translation is thereby measured against 
an absent universal possibility and found wanting. In other words, 
although there may regularly occur more or less successful acts of 
 
47 Benedetto Croce (1992 [1902], p. 76.). 
48 On the nexus of intuition-expression, see Benedetto Croce (1921, pp. 53-72, particularly p. 
66). Gentile’s attempt to think translation as a metaphor for the way in which the unity of 
spirit is secured against the Heraclitan flux of historical change can be found in Giovanni 
Gentile (1920, particularly pp. 372-3). On the debate between Croce and Gentile, considered in 
relation to Gramsci’s notion of translatability, see the important contribution of Domenico 
Jervolino, ‘Croce, Gentile and Gramsci on Translation’ (Jervolino, 2010, pp. 29-38). 
49 Q11§48, p. 1470 (FSPN, p. 309), August-December 1932. 





translation – success being determined differently in each case – 
translation as such, in its supposedly ‘pure’ form, never happens.  
It is precisely such a ‘pure’ conception of translation, however, 
that Gramsci’s development of the notion of reciprocal 
translatability puts in question. In its concrete historical reality, the 
practice of translation is never a pure transmission of an origin; 
were it pure in this sense, in a relation of identical, immediate and 
exhaustive re-presentation, there would be no need for translation 
in any sense at all, because it would always already have occurred in 
the origin’s identity with itself. Translation always and necessarily 
begins in media res, overdetermined by broader existing relations of 
force between cultures, languages, genres, and so forth. It is the 
constitutive unevenness of these relations of force which establish 
the possibility or – what is the same thing – the need to translate in 
the first place. The notion of parallel and reciprocal translatability 
emphasizes the multi-directionality of this relation, as both so-
called ‘source language’ and purported ‘target language’ are 
translated and retranslated into each other, without the privileging 
of any foundational instance.50 
Reciprocal translation can be ‘organic and profound’ in the philo-
sophy of praxis alone not because it represents a metanarrative of 
human history, or the type of Ursprache to which Benjamin’s ‘pure 
language’ has often wrongly been reduced. Rather, the organic and 
profound translations effected by the philosophy of praxis are 
based upon the fact that its emphasis upon the practical constitu-
tion even and especially of thought annuls the metaphysical claim 
to a qualitative distinction between supposedly universal and pur-
portedly particular discourses. It historically situates each of them 
as decisive elements in the organization of the socio-political real-
ities that do not precede them, and which they therefore do not 
merely express after the fact, but which they literally constitute 
through their relations.51 The relationship between theory and prac-
tice in this perspective is not to be conceived as application of the 
 
50 The notion of reciprocal translatability in this sense represents a concretization of Gramsci’s 
allusive metaphor of an ‘homogenous circle’ in relations between discourses. See, for instance, 
Q4§46, p. 472 (PN Vol. 2, p. 196), October-November 1930, later revised in Q11§65, p. 1492 
(SPN, p. 403), August-December 1932. For a careful analysis of the significance of this line of 
research, see Derek Boothman (2004b, p. 74 et sqq.). 
51 I have explored this dimension of the philosophy of praxis, particularly in Gramsci’s critique 
of the metaphysical limits of Croce’s idealist historicism, in Peter D. Thomas (2009, Chapter 
Seven). 





former to the latter, but as the mutual and on-going translatability 
between discourses that depend upon each other to be that which 
they are, in a differential rather than identitarian relation. Trans-
lation becomes here not the successful or deficient imitation of an 
origin, but instead a mode of intervention into the practical reality 
of the relations of translatability between discourses that already 
constitute the possibility and reality of each and any discourse. 
I would suggest that Benjamin’s notion of the transformative 
‘echo’ of the original in the translation should be read in such a 
dialectical optic, even as his metaphors in this text may seem to 
struggle to overcome the reliance of much translation theory in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries upon an ultimately Platonic 
rhetoric of origins. Just as ‘pure language’ for Benjamin neither 
precedes any particular language or text but emerges only as a 
horizon, fleetingly, in the practice of translation, so this ‘echo’ is 
not a repetition of something that was there in ‘the original’ itself. 
This echo is neither a return to a plenitude of origins, nor revelation 
of its destitution.52 It is produced only in the relation between texts, 
a relation that does not and cannot pre-exist the practice of 
translation, as the concrete mode of their relating. Thus, when 
Benjamin writes that the task of the translator ‘consists in finding 
that specific intention toward the language into which one is 
translating that awakens in that language the echo of the original’, 
the notion of an echo functions to indicate the difference that 
translation retrospectively inserts into the original itself, which now 
cannot be thought except via its ‘reverberation’ in translation. 53 
This echo does not re-present the meaning [Sinn] of the original, 
but re-activates and extends its ‘way of thinking’ [Art des Meinens] in 
 
52  Romain Descendre and Jean-Claude Zancarini, ‘De la traduction à la traductibilité’ 
(Descendre and Zancarini 2016), see Benjamin’s notion of an echo as a return to origins in a 
foundational-temporal sense, while De Man effectively understands it a revelation of the 
essentially disarticulated nature of the original itself (the pure form of language as such, bereft 
of the ‘illusion of meaning’). See ‘Conclusion: On Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the 
Translator”’ (de Man, 1984, p. 84). 
53 ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 16; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 258. Benjamin’s notion 
of an echo comprehended in this sense bears comparison to T. S. Eliot’s almost contempor-
aneous formulation of the notion of an ‘objective correlative’ as a ‘formula’ or ‘a set of objects, 
a situation, a chain of events’ that is capable of ‘re-evoking’ a particular emotion in poetry, or 
more precisely, of ‘re-evoking’ ‘normal’, non-poetic emotion in the type of emo-tional 
response distinctive to poetic sensibility. As with Benjamin’s echo, this re-evocation in fact 
constitutes an entirely new experience – an experience proper to the poetic – that is not a 
reproduction of its supposed forerunner, but which reacts back upon it, redefining its immedi-
acy in relation to the mediation of the poetic. See T. S. Eliot (1921, p. 92). 





an entirely different context.54 It thereby reorders the possibility of 
meaning and thinking in both ‘source’ and ‘target’ languages, in a 
dialectic of reciprocal transformation. 
 
7. Living Philology 
It is in the combination of perspectives from these three con-
stellations – retrospective reconfiguration, politically constructed 
correspondence, and reciprocal translatability – that there emerges 
the distinctive features of Gramsci’s reformulation of the Marxist 
tradition: the study of ‘definite and precise “individualities”’, 55 
undertaken not speculatively, but by means of ‘“active and con-
scious co-participation”’ and ‘“compassionality”’, ‘through a system 
that one could call “living philology”’. 56  It is this focus on the 
‘experience of immediate particulars’, and the non-hierarchical 
relations of reciprocal translatability that they can establish between 
themselves without subsumption to a universal instance, Gramsci 
argues, that represents the fundamental methodological innovation 
introduced by the philosophy of praxis. 
A similar orientation towards the relations of singular 
experiences traverses Benjamin’s work in its various phases and 
significant internal differences. It finds one of its most eloquent 
formulations in a letter to Adorno from the late 1930s, in terms 
remarkably similar to those of Gramsci’s notion of a ‘living 
philology’ as not only an historical method, but also as a political 
intervention. Benjamin here seems to expand the task that he had 
assigned to the translator in the early 1920s – of liberating a text 
from the weight of the past embodied in its ‘continuing life’ by 
endowing it with a qualitatively new afterlife oriented to the 
horizon of the pure language – into a general historical-materialist 
method for ‘redeeming’ [ambivalently positioned between erlösen 
and einlösen] the past from its imprisonment by and within the 
present.57 ‘The appearance of self-contained facticity that emanates 
from philological study and casts its spell on the scholar is dispelled 
according to the degree to which the object is constructed in 
 
54  ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, p. 18; ‘The Task of the Translator’, p. 260 (translation 
modified). 
55 Q7§6, p. 856 (PN Vol. 3, p. 159), November 1930. 
56 Q11§25, p. 1429 (SPN p. 429), July-August 1932. 
57 For an attempt to read (particularly the late) Benjamin’s theologically inflected Erlöung in the 
profane terms of Einlösung, promise and possibility, see W. Hamacher (2005, pp. 38-68). 





historical perspective. The lines of perspective in this conclusion, 
receding to the vanishing point, converge in our own historical 
experience. In this way, the object is constituted as a monad. In the 
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